Round 12: Tossup 9

In 1987, a benchmark model for these mechanisms was proposed by McAfee and McMillan. The optimal design for these mechanisms was proposed by Roger Myerson, which was based on the more specific direct revelation mechanism. A party involved in these mechanisms is incentivized to release all information per the linkage principle. The 2020 Nobel Prize for Economics was awarded to Milgrom and Wilson for their work on these mechanisms. A form of these mechanisms that follows the revenue-equivalence theorem was expanded by William Vickrey. Each player (10[1])has a weakly dominating strategy in the “second-price” form of these events. “English” (10[1])or “Dutch” versions of these events are distinguished by whether price is (10[1])ascending or decreasing. For 10 points, name these events where goods are sold through bidding. ■END■

ANSWER: auctions [or Dutch auctions; or English auctions; or Vickrey auctions]
<Columbia A, Social Science> | Packet M - Columbia A, Ohio State A, Maryland A, Toronto C, Clemson A, Notre Dame A
= Average correct buzzpoint

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Buzzes


Summary

TournamentEditionMatchHeardConv. %Neg %Avg. Buzz
California (South)Main Site4100%25%83.75
CanadaMain Site10100%10%83.70
Lower Mid-AtlanticMain Site714%0%126.00
Lower Mid-AtlanticMain Site786%14%103.00
MidwestMain Site8100%0%81.50
NortheastMain Site5100%0%89.00
OverflowMain Site3100%0%97.67
UKMain Site12100%8%94.75